The case is Sunpin Energy Serv., LLC v. Zoning Bd. of App. of Petersham, SJC-13860 (July 14, 2026). In rural Petersham the plaintiff company sought to build a large-scale ground-mounted solar energy system outside of the Town’s established Solar Electric Overlay District (SEOD). The Town’s zoning bylaws required a special permit from the zoning board of appeals for projects outside the SEOD.

Despite the project satisfying the bylaw’s requirements, one of the three board members voted to deny the permit because the project required significant tree cutting. The member cited state policy favoring forests for their water management capabilities, climate benefits, and ability to protect wildlife; thought the project would set a precedent of fragmenting forests in the Town; stated that it was “unclear” whether the board would approve of a future project located outside the SEOD; and concluded that the project would be detrimental to the character of the neighborhood.

As provided by G. L. c. 40A, § 9, ¶ 12, the board denied the special permit for lack of a unanimous vote in favor.

Sunpin challenged the board’s decision in Land Court. That judge granted summary judgment in favor of the board, ruling that it had properly applied the Town’s bylaw standards. Sunpin appealed to the Appeals Court. It vacated the Land Court’s decision, ruling that the board’s decision to favor forest preservation over a solar energy project was arbitrary and capricious.

The SJC granted a de novo review of the Land Court’s decision of whether the board’s decision was an unreasonable regulation of solar energy projects.

G.L. c. 40A, § 3, ¶ 9 states, “no zoning ordinance or by-law shall prohibit or unreasonably regulate the installation of solar energy systems or the building of structures that facilitate the collection of solar energy, except where necessary to protect the public health, safety or welfare.”

As stated in Tracer Lane, this provision of the Dover Amendment promotes solar energy projects and protects them from arbitrary and capricious municipal decisions. See G.L. c. 40A, § 3, ¶ 9, Tracer Lane II Realty, LLC v. Waltham, 489 Mass. 775, 779 (2022). However, the Dover Amendment does allow special permit requirements if they are “no more restrictive than those allowed by paragraph nine.” Cf. PLH LLC v. Ware, Mass. Land Ct., No. 18 MISC 000648, slip op. at 6,8 (Dec. 24, 2019) (Piper, C.J.), aff’d, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 1103 (2022).

As a result of these decisions, G.L. c. 40A, § 3, ¶ 9 does not limit a board’s powers to deny a special permit based on site specific conditions. Specifically, a board may deny a special permit application where it is “necessary” to protect public health, safety, and welfare.

The SJC ruled significantly in this case that “when considering a permit, a site-specific analysis is required, as is a more comprehensive review of the town’s over-all regulation in regard to the siting of large-scale solar energy systems, in order to determine whether the town has provided reasonable opportunities for these sitings.” Sunpin, at 22, citing G.L. c. 40A, § 3, ¶ 9 and Tracer Lane, 489 Mass. at 781.

According to the Court, this dual analysis ensures that municipalities narrowly and reasonably apply the special permit requirements to projects proposing a protected use under the Dover Amendment.

When the board denied the special permit because of concerns about tree-cutting, in effect it created a blanket prohibition on large-scale ground-mounted energy systems. The Town should not prioritize forests over solar energy projects, the Court reasoned, when forests cover 97 percent of the town. The SJC concluded the board’s denial of the permit was improper because the board’s reasoning was not “necessary” to protect public health, safety, or welfare in Petersham.

The SJC vacated the judgment of the Land Court and remanded the case back to that Court for an order to the board for further proceedings on this matter regarding the SJC’s opinion. The board must determine if preventing deforestation is “necessary” to protect public health, safety, and welfare. Then, the board must determine how “this site differs from others in the town where large solar energy systems may be sited.” Sunpin, at 24.

In conclusion, this decision informs municipalities on how to consider commercial solar installations. Cities and towns are to conduct a site specific review of such applications, as well as a comprehensive review of the city or town’s regulation of large-scale solar energy systems, to be sure the municipality has provided reasonable opportunities for them. Reasoning for a denial of a project must be “necessary” to protect the public health, safety, and welfare.

Madison A. Foley is a student at Vermont Law School who is presently a legal intern at our firm.